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Auktion: Zoll-Auktion, Auktionstheorie, Ausschreibung, Calcutta-Auktion, Bid-Shielding, Spaßbieter, Lockvogel, Vickreyauktion, Verkaufsagent (German Edition)
Bücher Gruppe
Paperback. Books LLC 2010-07-22.
ISBN 9781158764457
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Publisher description
Kapitel: Zoll-Auktion, Auktionstheorie, Ausschreibung, Calcutta-Auktion, Bid-Shielding, Spaßbieter, Lockvogel, Vickreyauktion, Verkaufsagent, Abschirmen, Amerikanische Versteigerung, Holländische Auktion, Beschaffungsauktion, Pay-To-Bid, All-Pay-Auktion, Voteauction. Aus Wikipedia. Nicht dargestellt. Auszug: A double auction is a process of buying and selling goods when potential buyers submit their bids and potential sellers simultaneously submit their ask prices to an auctioneer, and then an auctioneer chooses some price p that clears the market: all the sellers who asked less than p sell and all buyers who bid more than p buy at this price p. A double auction can be analyzed as a game. Players are buyers and sellers. They have some valuations of a good that is traded in an auction. Their strategies are bids for buyers and ask prices for sellers (that depend on the valuations of buyers and sellers). Payoffs depend on the price of the transaction and the valuation of a player. Consider a double auction with a single buyer and a single seller. Suppose that the valuation of a buyer is v and the valuation of a seller is c (e.g. the cost of producing the product). And v, c .Submitted bid of a seller is , and bid of a buyer is . Let . Suppose an auctioneer sets the price: if ? . And if trade does not occur. Utility of buyer is if ? and 0 if Utility of a seller is if ? and 0 if In a complete information (symmetric information) case when the valuations are common knowledge it can be shown that the continuum of pure strategy efficient Nash equilibriums exists with In an incomplete information (asymmetric information) case a buyer and a seller know only their own valuations. Suppose that these valuations are uniformally distributed over the same interval. Then it can be shown that such a game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with linear strategies. That is there is an equilibrium when both players' bids are some linear functions of th...http://booksllc.net/?l=de
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Auktion: Zoll-Auktion, Auktionstheorie, Ausschreibung, Calcutta-Auktion, Bid-Shielding, Spaßbieter, Lockvogel, Vickreyauktion, Verkaufsagent
Book reviews » Auktion: Zoll-Auktion, Auktionstheorie, Ausschreibung, Calcutta-Auktion, Bid-Shielding, Spaßbieter, Lockvogel, Vickreyauktion, Verkaufsagent (German Edition)
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